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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
This Petition for Review by Appellant Smith 's Food a n d Drug is from 
a final order of the Labor Commission of Utah dated March 16, 2009. This 
Court h a s jurisdiction over this appeal p u r s u a n t to Utah Code Annotated 
§§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63G-4-403, and 78-2a-3(2)(a) (2009). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Did the Labor Commission correctly determine tha t Ms. 
Chris tensen 's claim of injury to her neck, tha t occurred gradually over time 
from Ju ly or August 2001 to November 20, 2 0 0 1 , should be evaluated a s 
a cumulative t r a u m a "accident" ra ther t h a n a s a n "occupational disease"? 
S tandard of Review. In Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT 47, 396 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, the Court art iculated the proper s t anda rd of review for 
administrative proceedings. It s tated: 
mat te r s of s ta tutory construction are quest ions of law, reviewed 
for correctness . . . . An exception to this general rule exists if 
the legislature h a s either explicitly or implicitly granted 
discretion to the agency. However, absen t a grant of discretion, 
an agency's interpretat ion or application of a s ta tu tory term 
should be reviewed unde r the correction of error s t andard . 
Id. at f f 13-14; see also LPI Services v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT App 
375, 173 P.3d 858 . Appellants submit tha t a correction of error s tandard 
1 
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applies as the Labor Commission incorrectly interpreted and applied the 
applicable statutes and law in this action. 
This issue was preserved at R. 147-195. 
2 
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DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2001), of the Utah Worker's 
Compensation Act provides: 
(1) An employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident arising out 
of and in the course of the employee's employment, wherever 
such injury occurred, if the accident was not purposefully self-
inflicted, shall be paid . . . compensation for loss sustained on 
account of the injury . . . the amount provided for in this 
chapter for . . . medical, nurse, and hospital services and 
medicines, . . . provided for under this chapter. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-103. 
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable occupational 
disease means any disease or illness that arises out of and in 
the course of employment and is medically caused or aggravated 
by that employment. 
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-103. 
3 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This case presents the question whether the Utah Labor 
Commission correctly determined that a worker's claim of injury to her 
neck, that occurred gradually over time from July or August 2001 to 
November 20, 2001, should be evaluated as a cumulative trauma 
"accident", rather than as an, "occupational disease" (with the provisions 
of the Utah Occupational Disease Act applicable). 
Such distinction between whether Ms. Christensen's work events 
qualify as an industrial accident versus an occupational disease is 
relevant due to the apportionment provisions for non-industrial 
conditions available under the Utah Occupational Disease Act. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 (2009). 
Course of the Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
Ms. Christensen began working for Smith's Food & Drug ("Smith's) 
in its dairy around November 16, 1993 . (R., 189). Ms. Christensen 
filed two claims for workers' compensation benefits due to work 
accidents while working for Smith's as a cheese cook. 
In the first Application for Hearing, Ms. Christensen claims that 
she sustained a neck injury on February 1, 2001, while pulling a cart 
4 
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which handle broke. (R., 2). In the second Application for Hearing, Ms. 
Christensen claims that she was involved in an industrial accident by 
"cumulative work trauma," again involving her neck, that arose on 
November 20, 2001, as a result of stirring, lifting and carrying a large vat 
of cottage cheese while employed by Smith's over the course of several 
months. (R., 23, 42). 
Ms. Christensen also filed a third Application for Hearing for an 
occupational disease claim due to an injury to her neck from 1994 to 
2002 from lifting, reaching, and squeezing objects, but later withdrew 
that Application for Hearing at the evidentiary hearing. (R., 35, R., 172). 
Evidence was presented at the hearing from Aspen Ridge Physical 
Therapy noting that Ms. Christensen feels that the type of work she does 
has a cumulative effect, leading to the medical problems she is now 
having. Doctors note that Ms. Christensen had this particular job at 
Smith's for 8 V2 years and notes that Ms. Christensen described her work 
as involving a lot of lifting, reaching and squeezing bags of fruit and 
repeating this function for ten to thirteen hour shifts. (R., 42; R., 1 
Medical Exhibit, 43). 
On November 20, 2003, this case came on for hearing before the 
Utah Labor Commission. Judge Debbie L. Hann, Administrative Law 
5 
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Judge, presided at the hearing. At the hearing, Ms. Christensen denied 
that she sustained any specific injury on November 20, 2001, but rather 
classified her neck condition as one that occurred over time with 
symptoms commencing in July or August 2001. (R., 191; 134). Ms. 
Christensen also testified that she had neck and shoulder pain dating 
back to 1995, prior to her employment at Smith's. (R., 189, 192) . Ms. 
Christensen further testified that she began working for Smith's around 
1993 as a trainer in the dairy department which job duties entailed 
repetitive job assignments. (R., 189). 
On June 2, 2004, the Labor Commission issued Findings of Fact 
and Interim Order. (R., 59-65). 
On June 24, 2004, the Labor Commission referred this case to the 
medical panel. Dr. Joseph Q. Jarvis was appointed the chairperson for 
the medical panel. (R., 67-68). 
On February 23, 2005, the medical panel issued a report. (R., 71-
73). 
On March 18, 2005, Ms. Christensen filed her objection to the 
medical panel report. (R., 77-94). 
On March 31 , 2005, Smith's filed a Response to Ms. Christensen's 
Objection to the medical panel report. (R., 77-94). 
6 
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On August 31 , 2005, the medical panel was asked to clarify its 
report. (R., 115-116). 
On September 8, 2005, the medical panel issued a supplemental 
report. (R., 117-119). 
On December 29, 2005, the medical panel was asked to provide 
further clarifications. (R., 124-25). 
On January 11, 2006, the medical panel issued a second 
supplemental report. The medical panel ultimately found that 60% of 
Ms* Christensen's cervical spine condition was not work-related. (R., 
126-128). 
On June 29, 2006, ALJ Lorrie Lima issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order. (R., 131-145). The ALJ found that 
approximately three to four months prior to November 2001, Ms. 
Christensen experienced shoulder pain that was exacerbated by work. 
(R., 134). Based upon the panel's revised opinion, the ALJ found that 
Ms. Christensen's cervical condition was aggravated by cumulative work 
trauma that arose in November 2001 and awarded full worker's 
compensation benefits, without apportionment to pre-existing medical 
conditions. See id. The ALJ also found that no benefits were owed to 
7 
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Ms. Christensen as a result of any work event on February 1, 2001. See 
idL 
On July 26, 2006, Smith's filed a Motion for Review arguing that 
Ms. Christensen's claim should be classified as a occupational disease 
and benefits should, therefore, be apportioned according to the Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. (R., 146-196). Additionally, Smith's argued 
that apportionment principles should equally apply under the Utah 
Worker's Compensation Act, otherwise an unfair windfall of benefits 
would inure to the benefit of Ms. Christensen, and also would treat 
occupational diseases differently from industrial accidents. 
On March 16, 2009, the Labor Commission entered an Order 
Affirming ALJ's Decision. (R., 208-211). The Commission held that Ms. 
Christensen's claim is properly classified as a cumulative trauma injury 
- or "accident" - by November 20, 2001. Therefore, the Commission held 
that the case was properly evaluated under the Utah Worker's 
Compensation Act rather than the Utah Occupational Disease Act. No 
substantial analysis was provided by the Labor Commission regarding 
why Ms. Christensen's work event should be classified as an industrial 
accident. See id. 
8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Smith's has since filed a Petition for Review of the Order Affirming 
ALJ's Decision. 
9 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It is undisputed that Ms. Christensen suffered from a pre-existing 
deterioration of her cervical spine which was separate and not solely 
caused by her work activities for Smith's. Under Ms. Christensen's 
cumulative t rauma theory, the ALJ and Commission have correctly 
awarded to Ms. Christensen full compensation for all of her medical 
expenses and indemnity benefits despite the medical panel finding that 
60% of her cervical spine problem is not work related. For the Labor 
Commission to order Smith's to pay for all of Ms. Christensen's medical 
expenses and indemnity compensation without any apportionment for 
her pre-existing degenerative cervical spine condition, allows Ms. 
Christensen to reap a windfall and results in an unfair decision in favor 
of Ms. Christensen and against Smith's. Ms. Christensen should not be 
allowed to enjoy the benefit of full compensation for payment of her 
medical expenses and indemnity benefits at the expense of Smith's when 
her cervical spine condition is more related to non-industrial factors than 
any work related activity which aggravated her medical condition. 
Under a cumulative trauma accident theory, Ms. Christensen's 
claim for workers' compensation benefits should fail because 60% of Ms. 
10 
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Christensen's cervical spine problems were not caused by work related 
activities or conditions. To hold otherwise would suggest that an injured 
worker could prevail on a cumulative trauma accident theory even if only 
a nominal percentage- 1% - of the worker's medical problems were 
determined to be work related. Utah's Workers' Compensation Act was 
never designed to produce such a result. 
Under the theory of a cumulative trauma accident claim, Ms. 
Christensen is entitled to either 100% compensation for payment of all 
medical expenses and/or indemnity benefits, or she is not entitled to 
receive any compensation. For this reason, it makes sense that Ms. 
Christensen's cumulative trauma claim should be classified as an 
occupational disease claim which then allows the Labor Commission to 
apportion compensation, according to the medical panel's report, and 
which takes into consideration both the non-industrial and industrial 
factors that caused or contributed to Ms. Christensen's cervical spine 
condition. To apportion the medical cause of Ms. Christensen's condition 
between industrial and non-industrial factors is fair to both parties, and 
if applied under an occupational disease theory, results in an equitable 
result consistent with the medical panel report and Utah's Occupational 
Disease Act 
11 
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ARGUMENT 
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT MS. 
CHRISTENSEN'S NOVEMBER 2 0 , 2 0 0 1 CUMULATIVE TRAUMA 
CLAIM SHOULD BE CLASSIFIED AS AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT 
RATHER THAN AS AN OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE. 
In her Application for Hearing, Ms. Christensen raised a worker's 
compensation claim under the theory of a cumulative t rauma industrial 
accident, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 et seq., with an 
onset date of November 20, 2001. At hearing, Ms. Christensen clarified 
that her cumulative trauma accident allegedly resulted from her work 
activities of stirring, lifting and carrying large vats of cheese while 
working as a cheese cook for Smith's in July or August, 2001 through 
November 20, 2001. (R., 191-92).l 
Contrary to the Commission's ruling, Ms. Christensen's claim 
should be classified as an occupational disease and not a cumulative 
trauma accident. The import of this is evident when reviewing the 
provisions of the Utah Worker's Compensation Act versus that of the 
Utah Occupational Disease Act ("ODA"). For claims filed under Utah's 
1
 Ms. Christensen also raised an additional claim under the theory 
of an occupational disease for work exposure from 1994 through 2002. 
This occupational disease claim most appropriately fits the facts of this 
case, because of the long-term repetitive nature of the Ms. Christensen's 
work for Smith's, but Ms. Christensen withdrew her occupational disease 
claim at the evidentiary hearing. 
12 
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ODA, apportionment of medical and indemnity benefits is available 
under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110 for non-industrial conditions. By 
contrast, subject to the exception for permanent partial disability, Utah's 
WCA does not provide for apportionment for non-industrial conditions. 
Given that the panel opined that 60% of Ms. Christensen's neck 
condition is non-industrial, it is important for the court to determine if 
Ms. Christensen's claim is one that is classified as an occupational 
disease or an industrial accident, and to better clarify these statutes. 
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Code (Worker's Compensation Act) 
provides: 
(1) An employee . . . who is injured . . . by accident arising 
out of and in the course of the employee's employment, 
wherever such injury occurred, if the accident was not 
purposefully self-inflicted, shall be paid . . . compensation for 
loss sustained on account of the injury . . . the amount 
provided for in this chapter for . . . medical, nurse, and 
hospital services and medicines, . . . provided for under this 
chapter. 
Id. (Emphasis added). The term, "accident" is not defined by statute. 
By contrast, section 34A-3-103 of the Utah Code provides: 
For purposes of this chapter, a compensable occupational 
disease means any disease or illness that arises out of and in 
the course of employment and is medically caused or 
aggravated by that employment. 
13 
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Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-103. The term, "disease or illness* is not 
defined by statute, 
Utah's appellate courts have attempted to distinguish between the 
term "accident" and "occupational disease" as used in these statutes. In 
Carling v. Industrial Commission, 399 P.2d 202 (1965), the Court held: 
The Workmen's Compensation Act, Section 35-1-45, 
U.C.A. 1953, provides for an award to an employee "* * * who 
is injured * * * by accident arising out of or in the course of 
his employment * * *." There is no further definition of the 
term "accident," but this court has held that for the purpose 
of the Act it should be given a broad meaning, n l It connotes 
an unanticipated, unintended occurrence different from what 
would normally be expected to occur in the usual course of 
events. n2 We recognize the correctness of plaintiffs 
contention that even though there must be some such 
"accident" within the meaning of that statute, n3 this is not 
necessarily restricted to some single incident which happened 
suddenly at one particular time and does not preclude the 
possibility that due to exertion, stress or other repetitive 
cause, a climax might be reached in such manner as to 
properly fall within the definition of an accident as just stated 
above. n4 However, such an occurrence must be 
distinguished from gradually developing conditions which 
are classified as occupational diseases and which are not 
compensable except as provided in Chapter 2 of Title 35 
(Sections 35-2-1, et seq.), U.C.A. 1953. 
Carling v. Industrial Comm'n, 16 Utah 2d 260, 261-262 (Utah 1965); see 
also Kaiser Steel Corp. V. Monfredi, 631 P.2d 888 (Utah 1981). 
14 
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In Thompson v. Industrial Commission, 23 P.2d 930 (Utah 1933), 
the Court held: 
The word, "accident" refers to the cause of the injury, and it is 
here used in its ordinary and popular sense, as denoting an 
unlooked mishap, or an untoward event, which is not 
expected or designed by the workman himself, as a 
physiological injury as a result of the work he is engaged in, 
an unusual effect of a known cause, a casualty. It implies 
that there was an external act or occurrence which caused 
the injury or death. It contemplates an event not within one's 
foresight and expectation resulting in a mishap causing injury 
to the employee.' [1 Honnold, Workmen's Compensation, 274] 
* * * Where there is any attempt to define the meaning of the 
word 'accident,' as used in compensation acts, the cases cited 
by plaintiffs are generally in accord with the definition given 
by Honnold. What is termed an accident must be something 
out of the ordinary, unexpected, and definitely located as to 
time and place. If the injury is incurred gradually in the 
course of the employment, and because thereof, and there 
is no specific event or occurrence known as the starting 
point, it is held to be an occupational disease, and not an 
injury resulting from accident. Such, in the opinion of the 
[***15] writer, is the rule, well sustained by both reason and 
authority, and is not seriously controverted by any well-
considered case cited by either of the parties in the instant case." 
HN5 An occupational disease has been defined [**934] as 
"a diseased condition arising gradually from the character 
of the employee's work, but it is not an 'accident,"' and an 
accident "is distinguished from an occupational disease, 
in that it arises by some definite event, the date of which 
can be fixed with certainty, but which cannot be so fixed 
in the case of occupational disease. Wilson & Co. v. McGee 
(Okl. Sup.) 21 P.2d25, 27. 
15 
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Thompson v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Utah 247, 255 (Utah 1933).2 
Ms. Christensen did not sustain an industrial accident at work. At 
the evidentiary hearing, Ms. Christensen denied that she sustained any 
specific injury to her neck, shoulder, arms or hands on either November 
20, 2001,3 or on November 16, 2001,4 or on November 10, 2001.5 Ms. 
Christensen testified at the hearing as follows: 
Q. Did you recall an exact injury event on November 20 that 
involved your neck? 
A. No. 
2
 99 C.J.S. Workmen's Compensation § 169 at 566-68. 
"Occupational disease is [1] a disease caused by, or especially incident 
to, or the natural consequences of, the particular employment in which 
the workman is engaged, [2] that the disease arises out of and in the 
course of the employment, [3] that the disease is one which is caused by 
the workman's exposure, in the ordinary course of employment, to 
hazards greater or different than those involved in ordinary living or 
ordinary occupations, [4] that it develops gradually, [5] as a result of 
following a certain occupation or employment, in its ususal and ordinary 
course, [6] for a considerable period of time, and [7] that it is a disease 
which human foresight and science and industry, have not learned to 
fend against or eliminate.7' 
3
 The date of the alleged accident as plead by Ms. Christensen on 
the Application for Hearing. 
4
 The date Ms. Christensen returned to the Tanner Clinic for 
treatment with Dr. Jay Yates for left upper extremity pain- MRE, 005. 
5
 The date Ms. Christensen began to feel left upper extremity pain 
as reported to Dr. Yates on November 16, 2001. 
16 
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Q. Do you recall an injury event on November 16, 2001 that 
involved your neck? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you recall an exact injury event six days earlier on 
November 10th that would have involved your neck? 
A. No. 
Q. Do you recall an injury event on either the 20 th, the 16th, or 
the 10th of November that would have involved your shoulders? 
A. No. 
(See R., 191, Hearing Transcript page 82). 
Ms. Christensen also testified that she began to feel a slow and 
gradual onset of shoulder and/or neck symptoms in approximately July 
or August 2001. (R., 191-192). Ms. Christensen first noticed shoulder 
pain while driving her car - not while performing a work activity. (R., 
191). Ms. Christensen's shoulder pain would come and go depending 
upon her activity level. Ms. Christensen testified at the hearing as 
follows: 
Q. Let me ask you this, is it fair to say then that the pain in 
your neck developed over 
time? 
A. I started feeling an onset of pain months before November 
20. 
17 
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Q. Not years? 
A. No, not for numbness in my shoulder (inadudible). 
Q. Pain in your neck of any type, when did your first feel an 
onset of neck pain? 
A. (Inaudible) I didn't. 
Q. Can you determined when your first felt an onset of 
shoulder pain? 
A. Probably three to four months before I went to see Dr. 
Yeates is when it started. But it would go away. 
Q. So that would have been sometime in July or August of 
2001? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you'd feel shoulder pain where? 
A. In the roundness of my shoulder. 
Q. You're referring to your left shoulder, right at the socket? 
A. Yeah, I would notice it mainly driving down the road when 
I would go to put my arm up on the window. 
Q. When you were driving your car? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you testified that it would go away? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then it would come back again? 
18 
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A. Yes, depending on what I was doing. 
{See R., 191, Hearing Transcript pages 83-84). 
Ms. Christensen had also treated for a rm/hand pain, numbness, 
neck and right shoulder pain with Dr. Bennet as far back as May of 
1995.6 However, Ms. Christensen claims that the pain she felt while 
treating with Dr. Bennet could be distinguished from the type of pain she 
experienced when she began to treat with Dr. Yates in November 2001.7 
Ms. Christensen further testified that her shoulder and neck pain 
gradually intensified over time until she sought treatment from Dr. Yates 
on November 16, 2001.8 At this time, Ms. Christensen had been 
employed by Smith's for eight years. She worked as trainer. She was 
required to train new employees on the diary department equipment and 
fill-in when employees went on vacation or called in sick.9 She was 
6
 See Rl , Medical Record Exhibit pages 8-12. On May 9, 1995, Ms. 
Christensen reported her major complaints to be a rm/hand 
pain/numbness/neck pain. Neck and right shoulder - can't turn or move 
neck movement severe pain - pain into the arm starting today. 
7See R., 192, hearing transcript page 85. 
"See R., 191-192, hearing transcript page 83-85; Rl , Medical 
Records Exhibit page 007. 
9See R., 173, Hearing Transcript page 11. 
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required to perform repetitive work activities for Smith's for several 
years. 
Ms. Christensen's cumulative trauma accident claim should be 
more appropriately classified as an occupational disease claim. There 
was no sudden, unexpected or unintended occurrence that either caused 
or resulted in an injury to Ms. Christensen's cervical spine in November 
2001. See Allen v. Industrial Commission, 729, P.2d 15, 22-23 (Utah 
1986). Ms. Christensen's claim for benefits is clearly based upon 
repetitive work activities that resulted in a gradually developing cervical 
spine condition that at the very least developed over several months, and 
for which she first began to receive medical treatment as far back at 
1995. Indeed, following the strictures of Utah case law, the claim should 
be classified as an occupational disease since it gradually occurred over 
time, because there is no specific event or occurrence known as the 
starting point, and due to the fact that it is a disease that is greater for 
those in this occupation than for those in ordinary occupations. 
Thompson v. Industrial Comm% 82 Utah 247, 255 (Utah 1933). 
The ALJ and Commission both incorrectly concluded that Ms. 
Christensen's claim should be classified as an accident and not as an 
occupational disease, ''because the period of time in which she [Ms. 
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Christensen] experienced shoulder pain was short until the pain evolved 
into chronic pain thereafter." The ALJ further concluded that Ms. 
Christensen's cumulative t rauma was, "distinguishable from an 
occupational disease which typically evolves over a period of several 
months or years." (See R., 141, Finding of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order pages 10-11). 
Ms. Christensen's shoulder and neck pain did evolve over a period 
of months, and more likely years as she had treated for similar neck and 
shoulder symptoms with her chiropractor dating back to 1995. In 
addition, Ms. Christensen's neck/shoulder pain developed from her 
repetitive work activities and not from a specific work accident or injury. 
Ms. Christensen's job as a trainer required her to perform repetitive work 
activities, and she regularly performed such work activities for Smith's 
for several years. 
The facts of this case dictate that Ms. Christensen's claims should 
have been classified and adjudicated as an occupational disease claim 
regardless of the title assigned to the claim by Ms. Christensen. See 
Allen at 18, citing Carting v. Industrial Commission, 399 P.2d 202 (Utah 
1965) (A claim may be classified as an occupational disease claim if the 
underlying medical complaint is a "gradually developing condition."). See 
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also A.A. v. Icon Health and Fitness, Labor Commission case no. 99-0776, 
(date 1/31/01) (Where the worker's claim is based upon a gradually 
developing condition, the Labor Commission concludes that the claim 
must be adjudicated according to the provisions of the Utah Occupational 
Disease Act). See R., 161. 
Similar to the repetitive work performed by the worker in Icon, Ms. 
Christensen's cumulative trauma accident claim involved repetitive work 
activities of stirring, lifting, and carrying large vats of cheese each day 
over several years. Her medical condition gradually worsened over time 
until her neck/shoulder pain prompted her to receive medical care. 
There was no specific accident or injury event sustained by Ms. 
Christensen to her cervical spine. Consequently, Ms. Christensen's 
cumulative t rauma claim should be adjudicated according to Utah's 
Occupational Disease Act. 
The medical panel's effort to apportion the medical cause of Ms. 
Christensen's cervical spine condition between non-industrial and work 
related factors is appropriate under Section 34A-3-101, Utah Code Ann., 
and Rule R602-2-2(l), Utah Administrative Code. To hold otherwise in 
this case will set a precedence that eliminates Utah's Occupational 
Disease Act from application in cases where the injured worker does not 
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sustain a specific and identifiable work related injury, and the worker's 
complaints of pain from repetitive work activities are slow and gradual 
over a significant length of time. Such a ruling was not intended by our 
state legislature when Utah's Occupational Disease Act was enacted. 
According to the medical panel, Ms. Christensen's work activity for 
Smith's merely contributed to the pre-existing deterioration of Ms. 
Christensen's cervical spine. The medical panel considered that there 
were both industrial and non-industrial components to Ms. Christensen's 
cervical spine condition. Many factors contributed to the occurrence of 
Ms. Christensen's spine condition, including her genetic disposition to 
such a condition, smoking, nutrition and physical load and stress on the 
spine of both an industrial and non-industrial nature. In fact, the 
medical panel concludes that absent the non-industrial factors, Ms. 
Christensen likely would not have developed cervical spine problems, 
even if she had experienced the several years of industrial exposure as 
outlined in the Findings of Fact.10 
Utah's Occupational Disease Act allows for the payment of worker's 
compensation benefits for a work-related aggravation of a non-work 
10
 See medical panel report dated September 8, 2005 answer to 
question no. l , page 1. 
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related illness or disease. Section 34A-3-103, Utah Code Ann., includes 
aggravation as part of the definition of a compensable occupational 
disease. Also, Section 34A-3-110(4), Utah Code Ann., provides for the 
apportionment of both medical and indemnity compensation when a 
disability (deterioration of the cervical or lumbar spine), which is not 
itself compensable, is aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way 
contributed by an occupational exposure. Dale T. Smith & Sons v. Utah 
Labor Commission, 2009 UT 19, 208 P.3d 533 (Utah 2009) (holding that 
the term "compensation" includes medical expenses in apportionment 
under Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-110); Temmie K. Murphy v. City Market, 
Labor Commission case no. 01-0827, (date 4 /15/04) . 
In the City Market case, the Labor Commission ordered the 
employer/carrier to pay for 40% of the worker's medical expenses of her 
non-industrial cervical spondylosis which was aggravated by her work 
conditions under an extension of occupational disease coverage. In City 
Market, the Labor Commission cited Larson's Workers' Compensation 
Law, Section 52.06(3) which addresses the aggravation of a pre-existing 
weakness as an occupational disease and not as an accident. Larson's 
states in pertinent part as follows: 
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Closely related to the question of preexisting allergy is 
that of preexisting weakness, disease, or susceptibility. 
Although there is some contra authority, most courts treat 
this problem the same as that of allergies, and hold that 
when distinctive employment hazards act upon these 
preexisting conditions to produce a disabling disease, the 
result is an occupational disease. 
(See Larson's at Section 52.06(3); emphasis added). 
In this case, Ms. Christensen's cumulative t rauma accident claim 
should be classified as an occupational disease claim. Ms. Christensen's 
repetitive work aggravated her non-industrial cervical spine problems. 
The facts of this case support an occupational disease claim and not a 
cumulative t rauma accident claim. Smith's requests that the Court of 
Appeals reverse the Commission's holding and conclude that Ms. 
Christensen's claim should be classified as an occupational disease. Ms. 
Christensen's worker's compensation claims, which include both medical 
expenses and an award for indemnity benefits should then be 
apportioned under Utah Code Ann. 34A-3-110. Smith's should be 
ordered to pay for no more than 40% of Ms. Christensen's claim for 
indemnity benefits and medical expenses consistent with the medical 
panel report. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments set forth herein, Smith's requests that 
the Court of Appeals reverse the Commission's Order Affirming ALJ's 
Decision dated March 16, 2009, and hold that the Occupational Disease 
Act applies to Ms. Christensen's claim for workers' compensation 
benefits. This Court should overturn that part of the Labor 
Commission's Order and apportion the liability for Ms. Christensen's 
claims between both the non-industrial (60%) and industrial (40%) 
causes of Ms. Christensen's cervical spine condition. 
Respectfully submitted this / * day of March, 2010. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
Bret A. Gardner 
Kristy L. Bertelsen 
Attorneys for Appellants, Smith's Food 
& Drug 
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SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG, 
Respondent. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER 
Case Nos. 2002948, 2002949, 2002436 




November 20,2003,160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. The hearing 
was pursuant to Order and Noticed of the Utah Labor Commission. 
Debbie Hann, Administrative Law Judge. 
The petitioner, Gina Christensen, was present and represented by Richard 
R. Burke, Esq. 
The respondent, Smith's Food & Drug, was represented by Bret Gardner, 
Esq. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case Number 2002436 - February 1, 2001, Date of Injury 
On April 23,2002, Gina Christensen (Petitioner) filed an Application for Hearing and alleged 
entitlement to medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total compensation and 
interest resulting from a February 1, 2001, industrial accident when she hit her neck. On May 7, 
2002, the Utah Labor Commission (Commission) issued a Notice of Formal Adjudicative 
Proceedings and Order for Answer. On June 5,2002, Smith's Food & Drug (Respondent) filed an 
Answer and denied Petitioner was injured as alleged because the accident was never reported. It 
further denied that Petitioner was injured by accident as she alleged. 
At the hearing, Respondent did not pursue the lack of notice defense based upon 
Petitioner's written report of the accident on the day it occurred to Respondent. Respondent denied 
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Case Number 2002948 - November 20, 2001, Date of Injury 
On August 27, 2002, Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing and alleged entitlement to 
medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total compensation, temporary partial 
compensation, permanent partial compensation, travel expenses and interest resulting from a 
November 20,2001, cumulative trauma accident due to Petitioner's work activities of stirring, lifting 
and carrying large vats of cottage cheese. On September 18, 2002, the Commission issued a 
Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings and Order for Answer. On October 18, 2002, 
Respondent filed an Answer and denied that Petitioner was injured as alleged because she never 
reported an accident, cumulative trauma or otherwise. Respondent further denied that Petitioner 
was injured by accident as alleged. 
At the hearing, Respondent did not pursue the lack of notice defense. Respondent denied 
the accident was the medical cause of Petitioner's cervical spine condition. 
Case Number 2002949 - Occupational Disease period of exposure 1994, through 2002. 
On August 27, 2002, Petitioner filed an Application for Hearing and alleged entitlement to 
medical expenses, recommended medical care, temporary total compensation and interest resulting 
from an industrial exposure due to repetitive lifting, reaching and squeezing over the period 1994, 
through 2002, resulting in a neck condition. On September 18, 2002, the Commission issued,a 
Notice of Formal Adjudicative Proceedings and Order for Answer. On October 18, 2002, 
Respondent filed an answer and denied the claim because Petitioner failed to timely report an 
occupational disease. It denied Petitioner's condition was the result of an occupational exposure. 
At the hearing, Petitioner withdrew the occupational disease claim and the parties agreed the 
case should be dismissed. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
On June 2, 2004, a Findings of Fact & Interim Order was issued by Judge Hann. On 
June 24, 2004, the medical issues were referred to a Commission medical panel. On February 
24, 2005, the medical panel filed its report. On February 24, 2005, a copy of the medical panel 
report was mailed via certified mail to each party and they were allowed 15 days to file an 
objection. 
On August 31, 2005, the medical panel was asked to clarify its medical panel report. On 
September 8, 2005, the medical panel filed a supplemental report. On September 9, 2005, a 
copy of the report was mailed via certified mail to each party and they were allowed 15 days to 
respond. 
On December 29,2005, the medical panel was asked to clarify its medical panel report. 
On January 11, 2005, the medical panel filed a supplemental report. On January 12, 2006, a 
copy of the report was mailed via certified mail to each party and they were allowed 15 days to 
respond. 
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OBJECTION TO MEDICAL PANEL REPORT 
Section 34A-2-601(d)(ii) and (iii) of the Workers Compensation Act outlines the 
objection process. Any objection filed under this provision is to the entry of the medical panel 
report into the record. However, the preponderance of the evidence must still be considered in 
reaching the final determination. Thus, the objection does not go to the weight the report should 
be given but to its admission into the record. 
On March 8, 2005, an Order was issued to allow the parties to file any objection to the 
medical panel report by March 18, 2005. Petitioner filed a timely objection on March 18, 2005. 
On April 4, 2005, Respondent filed an untimely response. 
On September 23, 2005, Respondent filed an untimely objection to the medical panel 
supplemental report. On November 7, 2005, Petitioner filed an untimely response. 
Petitioner argued that apportionment of a permanent impairment to a preexisting 
condition is appropriate where there is demonstrated evidence of cervical problems which pre-
date the industrial injury. Petitioner asserted that the only evidence presented as a prior injury or 
limitation was Petitioner's industrial incident on February 1, 2001, which the medical panel 
determined was not medically connected to her cervical condition. Petitioner further argued that 
medical expenses cannot be apportioned in industrial accident/cumulative trauma cases. 
Based on the foregoing, there is nothing within Petitioner's objection that would 
prevent the medical panel report from being entered into the evidentiary record. The medical 
panel conducted a comprehensive review of the history and development of Petitioner's medical 
condition. The panel had access to Petitioner's compete medical history as well as an 
opportunity to personally examine her. With that information the panel performed the function 
requested of it - the impartial application of the panel's medical knowledge, experience and 
judgment to the circumstances of Petitioner's case. Accordingly, the medical panel report is 
admitted into the record, and any facts found by the medical panel not in conflict with the 
Findings of Fact are admitted into the record pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-601(2)(d). 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Employment and Compensation. 
Petitioner was employed in Respondent's dairy for approximately eight years. In 2001, 
Petitioner's job was to train new hires on how to make cultured dairy products and to fill in for dairy 
workers who were on vacation. The parties stipulated that on February 1,2001, Petitioner's weekly 
compensation rate was $408.00 and on November 20, 2001, it was $421.00. 
2. Industrial Injuries and Medical Treatment. 
A. February 1,2001. 
On February 1, 2001, Petitioner was changing a roll of shrink wrap on the shrink wrap 
( \ f \ 4 r%g* 
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machine. The machine was about 6 feet tall, 4.5 feet wide and 15-16 feet long. Petitioner was 
bending over with her legs bent to lift out the empty roll of shrink wrap by pulling on a handle. As 
she lifted the handle, it broke partly loose when a bolt holding it sheared, causing her to stumble 
backward about 2 to 2.5 feet and hit the back of her neck on an electrical box attached to the wall 
that stuck out about 2 to 2.5 feet. The blow to Petitioner's neck was across her neck as she hit the 
edge of the box causing her head to go forward. Petitioner's arms went numb, a sensation she 
described as similar to hitting one's "funny bone" and she lost feeling in her index finger and thumb. 
The numbness went away in about 30-45 seconds. About two hours later, Petitioner's neck became 
stiff. Petitioner reported the injury that day and filled out a report (Exhibit P-1). Petitioner left her shift 
a couple of hours early and then returned to work the next week after resting over the weekend. 
She did not miss any further work. 
B. November 20,2001. 
In November 2001, Petitioner's job duties were as a cheese cook where milk was converted 
to cheese curd in eight large vats holding 350,000 pounds of milk that were about 25 to 40 feet long 
and 4.5 feet wide with the top edge of the vat at Petitioner's shoulder level. Petitioner and a 
coworker worked the shift in this area of the dairy. The vats were filled with milk from an overhead 
line that Petitioner attached to the vat. Petitioner pushed a button to begin filling. Once the vat was 
filled with milk and starter, it sat for 3 to 3.5 hours. During this time, Petitioner filled the other vats. 
Petitioner and her coworker lifted two stainless steel screens with wire used as cutters, one at a 
time, and attached them to an overhead mechanism above the vat. This required Petitioner to reach 
both arms out straight in front of her. Then, Petitioner attached a cross cut knife to an overhead 
mechanism and Petitioner and her coworker pushed and pulled it back and forth across the width of 
the vat at shoulder height for the vat's entire length through the cheese, making about 8 cuts per vat. 
Next, Petitioner and her coworker pulled the knives out of the vat and inserted a 6 foot heater that 
weighed about 5 to10 pounds into the cheese. Following this step, Petitioner and coworker inserted 
6 foot stainless steel paddles on a shaft that weighed 50 to 60 pounds to an overhead mechanism 
above the vat. This was performed at shoulder level with Petitioner's arms outstretched. There were 
2 paddles per tank and it was not uncommon to have to make more than one attempt to hook the 
paddle to the mechanism. After the heating/paddle process was complete, Petitioner and her 
coworker removed the paddles and placed them in the next vat ready for the same process. After 
removing the paddles, Petitioner and her coworker attached two pushers that weighed about 65 to 
70 pounds to the same overhead mechanism, used for the paddles, and utilized the same 
movements. The pushers and paddles were lifted by Petitioner. The pushers pushed the cheese 
from the vat into a pipe. Once the vat was empty, Petitioner and coworker cleaned the vat by 
standing at the side, which is about armpit level, and reached over using a brush with a 5 to 6 foot 
handle to scrub the bottom and both sides of the vat. Then, Petitioner and her coworker rinsed the 
vat. 
Two employees worked in the vat room on 12 hour shifts and 8 vats were used on each shift 
so there were no empty vats. Petitioner took two 15 minute breaks and a 30 to 45 minute lunch 
break. 
Approximately three to four months before November 2001, Petitioner experienced shoulder 
pain that was exacerbated by work but it always resolved. In November 2001, Petitioner 
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experienced stiffness and soreness in her shoulder. Petitioner testified that the pain she 
experienced at that time was different from the intermittent pain that she felt a few months earlier. 
On approximately November 10,2001, Petitioner experienced constant wrist, elbow and shoulder 
pain. She experienced intermittent numbness in her index finger and thumb. 
On November 16, 2001, Petitioner sought treatment with Dr. Yates at the Tanner Clinic for 
complaints of shoulder pain for the past six days. The x-rays of Petitioner's shoulder were 
unremarkable but cervical spine x-rays revealed spondylosis consistent with degenerative disc 
disease. Dr. Tanner referred Petitioner to physical therapy at Aspen Ridge. Medical exhibit 5. 
Petitioner began physical therapy on November 19,2001. The physical therapist noted "...she is not 
sure how she injured her neck but does a lot of lifting at work." Medical exhibit 23-28. 
When Petitioner asked for a light duty assignment, Respondent sent her to WorkMed for 
evaluation on November 20, 2001. Petitioner was evaluated for neck pain following lifting at work 
and she was assessed with left cervical nerve impingement at C6-7. The physician's first report of 
injury noted that a work causal relationship was undetermined. Medical exhibit 45. 
Dr. Yates referred the petitioner to Dr. MacFarlane for further evaluation. On January 7, 
2002, a cervical MRI showed that Petitioner had a C6-7 disc herniation, disc abnormality at C5-6 
and disc herniation at C4-5. Dr. MacFarlane recommended possible surgery. Medical exhibit 50-
51. On January 28, 2002, Petitioner returned with pain after increasing her activity level. Surgery 
was scheduled for February 28, 2002. Medical exhibit 53. 
On February 25, 2002, Dr. Shepherd performed an independent medical evaluation of 
Petitioner at Respondent's request. Dr. Shepherd found no medical causal relationship between 
Petitioner's work activities and the three level disc involvement. He noted that Petitioner had a pre-
existing upper extremity parasthesias and, although her work might have aggravated the condition, it 
was not the cause. Medical exhibit 64. 
On February 28,2002, Dr. MacFarlane performed an anterior cervical discectomy and fusion 
and C4-C7. Medical exhibit 95. In a March 1,2002 letter, Dr. MacFarlane states "Ms. Christensen 
was well prior to a work related injury of November 20, 2001..." and during the surgery, "...we did 
indeed find acute disc herniations at those levels. There was evidence of acute damage to the 
posterior longitude and the ligament with subsequent disc herniation causing compression 
centrally..." As a result, Dr. MacFarlane was of the opinion that Petitioner suffered an acute event as 
the result of a work injury. Medical exhibit 54. 
On June 5, 2002, Dr. MacFarlane noted Petitioner's neck and arm pain had completely 
resolved. Medical exhibit 59. Petitioner was given light duty work when she was initially released to 
light duty on May 9, 2002. 
Petitioner was again evaluated by Dr. Shepherd on June 18, 2003, and he assigned an 
impairment rating of 23% whole person to Petitioner's condition although he did not believe there 
existed a medical causal connection between a work injury and her condition. Medical exhibit 74. 
Petitioner was evaluated by Dr. Dall who opined the most significant incident was the 
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February 1,2001, injury when she struck her head on the electrical box based upon her description 
of bilateral upper extremity parasthesias. Dr. Dall assigned an impairment rating of 17% whole 
person impairment as the result of this injury and he noted the remaining problems Petitioner 
experienced were a cascade from the February 2001, injury. Medical exhibit 78-87. 
Petitioner was again evaluated by Dr. Shepherd on October 3,2003, who opined there was 
no medical causal connection between Petitioner's cervical disc herniations and the February 10, 
2001, injury because the symptoms she had pre-dated that injury. Dr. Shepherd also noted that Dr. 
Dall was not given all the medical records as part of his evaluation, and he pointed specifically to the 
chiropractic records where Petitioner had reported numbness in her arms and hand prior to either 
injury. Medical exhibit 76-77. 
3. Prior Medical Treatment. 
Prior to 2001, Petitioner received chiropractic treatment for neck pain along with arm and 
hand numbness. On May 9,1995, Petitioner sought treatment at Bennett Chiropractic and reported 
that she could not turn or move her neck without severe pain and she had pain in her arm. 
Petitioner underwent a course of treatment through June 1995. Medical exhibit 8-12. Petitioner 
also underwent a course of chiropractic treatment with Dr. Kunzler beginning July 20, 2000, for 
headache, neck pain, upper back pain and low back pain. Petitioner also reported arm numbness, 
left more than right. Medical exhibit 18-20. In a January 17, 2002 letter, Dr. Kunzler noted that 
when he examined Petitioner and took x-rays, there did not appear to be any disc problems and 
Petitioner's condition at that time was not severe. Medical exhibit 22. 
On June 27,1989, Petitioner had a cervical spine x-ray due to a hyperextension injury to her 
neck. Medical exhibit 88. Petitioner slipped in her shower and struck the right side of her head and 
reported increasing pain radiating up into her head and down into her right shoulder on October 19, 
1992. The physician at Tanner Clinic observed no tenderness along Petitioner's cervical spine and 
she had normal neck range of motion although she experienced tenderness over the right occiput 
and down into the paraspinious muscles. Medical exhibit 2. Petitioner also had a mass in her neck 
removed in 1997. Medical exhibit 89-90. 
4. Medical Panel Report and Supplements. 
The medical panel consisted of Drs. Joseph Jarvis, Chairman, and Dennis Gordon, 
orthopedic surgeon. The medical panel examined Petitioner on August 5, 2004, and reviewed 
her medical and diagnostic records. 
A. February 1,2001. 
The medical panel opined that there was no medical nexus between Petitioner's current 
medical condition and her industrial accident on February 1, 2001. The medical panel noted that 
cervical disc pathology was generally considered a consequence of chronic deterioration due to 
multiple factors including genetic predisposition, nutrition and physical load or stress on the 
spine. The medical panel further noted that a single event, such as Petitioner experienced on 
February 1, 2001, was unlikely to be the sole proximate or substantial cause of her cervical disc 
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rupture. The medical panel observed that following Petitioner's industrial accident, her 
symptoms resolved quickly and she resumed her regular work duties for eight months. 
B. November 20,2001. 
The medical panel opined there was a medical nexus between Petitioner's current 
medical condition and her cumulative work injury on November 20, 2001. The medical panel 
noted there was published evidence that repetitive lifting and stress to the upper extremities 
performed by Petitioner at Respondent's facility would have contributed or aggravated 
deterioration of her cervical spine. The medical panel further noted that Petitioner's x-rays of 
November 2001, showed narrowing of the C6-7 disc space with cervical spondylosis which 
required an extended period of time to develop. 
The medical panel further opined that other non-industrial factors may have contributed 
to Petitioner's cervical disc disease in addition to her work. The medical panel noted that 
medical literature is replete with evidence that other non-industrial factors (both inherited and 
acquired) would have been necessary for the development of Petitioner's condition. Therefore, 
the medical panel further noted, that absent the non-industrial factors, Petitioner would not have 
developed cervical spine problems even with the performance of her work activities. The 
medical panel concluded that Petitioner's repeated lifting and other work activities aggravated 
the preexisting non-industrial conditions which led to her symptoms and diagnosis of cervical 
pathology after November 2001. 
The medical opined that Petitioner was medically stable on June 5, 2002, based on Dr. 
MacFarlane's note that Petitioner's neck and arm pain had completely resolved. The medical 
panel assessed an impairment rating of 17% percent whole person due to Petitioner's three 
level cervical disc excision and fusion. The medical panel apportioned 60% of the impairment 
rating to Petitioner's preexisting condition and 40% to industrial factors. 
The medical panel opined that the medical care Petitioner received related to her 
cumulative trauma injury on November 1, 2001, was as follows: Dr. Yates evaluation in 
November 2001, including radiography, physical therapy at Aspen Ridge, WorkMed evaluation 
in November 2001, Dr. MacFarlane's evaluation in January 2002, including a MRI, Petitioner's 
cervical discectomy and fusion in February 2002, and follow-up care through June 2002. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 34A-2-401 of the Workers Compensation Act requires employers and their 
insurance carriers to pay disability benefits and medical expenses for employees who suffer 
accidental injuries "arising out of and in the course" of their employment. An injury "arises out of 
employment when the employment is both the legal and medical cause of the injury." Allen v. 
Industrial Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986). In this case, Respondent questioned whether 
Petitioner has satisfied the requirements of medical causation. However, before addressing the 
issue of medical causation, the issue of legal causation is analyzed. 
001 fV? 
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1. Legal Causation. 
In Price River Coal Co. v. Industrial Commission, 731 P.2d 1079 (Utah 1986), the Court 
explained the requirements of legal causation as follows: 
Under Allen, a usual or ordinary exertion, so long as it is an activity connected with the 
employee's duties, will suffice to show legal cause. However, if the claimant suffers from 
a pre-existing condition, then he or she must show that the employment activity involved 
some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the "usual wear and tear and 
exertions of nonemployment life." 
The Court in Allen developed an objective standard of comparison to evaluate typical 
non-employment activities performed by today's society. Typical activities and exertions 
included taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel, changing a 
flat tire on a car, lifting a small child to chest height and climbing stairs. 
Before a higher legal causation standard applies, an employer must prove medically that 
the claimant suffered from a preexisting condition that contributed to the injury. Nyrehn v. 
Industrial Commission etai, 800 p.2d 330 (Ct. App. 1990). 
A. Preexisting Condition. 
The preponderance of evidence, based on the opinions of the medical panel and Dr. 
Shepherd, demonstrates that Petitioner suffered from a preexisting condition that contributed to 
her cervical condition. The medical panel observed that the narrowing of Petitioner's C6-7 disc 
space with cervical spondylosis required an extended period of time to develop. Dr. Shepherd 
noted that Petitioner had a preexisting upper extremity parasthesias. 
B. Higher Legal Causation Standard. 
The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Petitioner's work activities as a cheese cook 
in November 2001, during a 12 hour shift included the following: (1) repeat lifting/connecting 
lines and screen cutters over eight filled vats that were as tall as Petitioner's shoulders, (2) 
push/pull a knife back and forth (with Petitioner on one side of a vat and a coworker on the other 
side) across the width of each vat (4.5 wide) at shoulder height, (3) insert a six foot heater into 
each vat and insert two six foot paddles onto a shaft, weight between 50 to 60 pounds, onto an 
overhead mechanism above each vat
 r Petitioner performed this work activity by herself at 
shoulder level with arms outstretched, (4) remove the paddles and insert two pushers, weight 
between 65-70 pounds, to the overhead mechanism - Petitioner performed this work activity by 
herself with the same movements as the paddles (the pushers pushed the cheese into a pipe), 
and (5) clean each vat's sides and bottom with a five to six foot handle with attached brush 
standing at armpit level and reaching over the side. Petitioner and a coworker rinsed each vat.1 
1 Based on the medical panel report, Petitioner's industrial accident on February 1, 2001, was not the cause of her 
medical condition. See Medical Causation under Discussion and Conclusions of Law. Therefore, whether 
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The preponderance of evidence demonstrates that Petitioner's aggregate exertion, 
during a 12 hour shift of multiple days, of repetitive lifting, connecting, pushing/pulling and 
cleaning either overhead or back and forth at Petitioner's shoulder level and the repetitive lifting 
overhead, in tandem with a coworker, of tools that weighed up to 70 pounds, exceeded the 
typical nonemployment life activities identified in Allen. For example, typical nonemployment lift 
activities and exertions would include taking full garbage cans to a street, lifting and carrying 
baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on a car or lifting a small child to chest height. However, 
Petitioner performed the same work activities as described above repeatedly over eight vats that 
were as high as her shoulders during her work shift and over a period of approximately four 
months. 
In Nyhren, the court held that the employee's cumulative lifting tubs of merchandise 30 to 
36 times daily over a period of time caused unusual and extraordinary wear and tear on her body 
when compared to the usual wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life as discussed in 
Allen. In the present matter, Petitioner's lifting, connecting, pushing/pulling and cleaning of items 
at shoulder height or overhead may not be considered unusual when performed periodically. 
However, Petitioner performed the same repeat work activities, multiplied by several vats, during 
a 12 hour work shift over a period of time. Accordingly, Petitioner's employment contributed 
something substantial to increase the risk she faced in everyday life because of her preexisting 
condition. 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's work activities met the higher legal causation 
requirement under Allen. 
2. Medical Causation. 
The significance of medical causation and the importance of medical panels in 
evaluating medical causation was discussed in Allen. 
The purpose of the medical cause test is to ensure that there is a medically 
demonstrable causal link between the work-related exertions and the 
unexpected injuries that resulted from those strains. 
The purpose of medical panels was discussed in Schmidt v. Industrial 
Commission, 617 P.2d 693 (Utah 1980). 
With the issue being one primarily of causation, the importance of the . . . 
medical panel becomes manifest. It is through the expertise of the medical 
panel that the Commission should be able to make the determination of 
whether the injury sustained a claimant is causally connected to or 
contributed to by the claimant's employment. 
Petitioner's industrial accident on February 1, 2001, met the higher legal causation standard is not analyzed in this 
section. 
00139 
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A. Industrial Accident-February 1,2001. 
The preponderance of evidence, based on the opinions of the medical panel and Dr. 
Shepherd, demonstrates that there was no medical causal relationship between Petitioner's 
industrial accident on February 1, 2001. The medical panel opined that cervical disc pathology 
was generally considered a consequence of chronic deterioration due to multiple factors such as 
genetic disposition, smoking, nutrition and physical load or stress on the spine. The medical 
panel further opined that Petitioner's work activity on February 1, 2001, would not be the sole, 
proximate or substantial cause of her cervical disc rupture. Moreover, Petitioner's symptoms 
resolved quickly and Petitioner worked regular duty for eight months. Dr. Shepherd opined that 
Petitioner's symptoms pre-dated her industrial accident. 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's industrial accident on February 1, 2001, did not 
cause her cervical condition. 
B. Cumulative Trauma Injury - November 20,2001. 
The preponderance of evidence, based on the opinion of the medical panel, 
demonstrates that Petitioner sustained a cumulative trauma work injury on November 20,2001. 
The medical panel opined that Petitioner's repetitive lifting and stress to her upper extremities 
contributed to or aggravated deterioration of her cervical spine.2 The medical panel observed 
that the narrowing of Petitioner's C6-7 disc space with cervical spondylosis would have required 
an extended period of time to develop. 
The medical panel further opined that other non-industrial factors may have contributed 
to Petitioner's cervical disc disease in addition to her work. The medical panel noted that 
medical literature is replete with evidence that other non-industrial factors (both inherited and 
acquired) would have been necessary for the development of Petitioner's condition. Therefore, 
the medical panel further noted, that absent the non-industrial factors, Petitioner would not have 
developed cervical spine problems even with the performance of her work activities. The 
medical panel concluded that Petitioner's repeated lifting and other work activities aggravated 
the preexisting non-industrial conditions which led to her symptoms and diagnosis of cervical 
pathology after November 2001. 
Petitioner's work situation was similar to the facts in Nyhren as discussed above. In 
Nyhren, the injured worker lifted tubs multiple times daily and experienced pain over a period of 
time. In this matter, Petitioner experienced periodic shoulder pain, which resolved, for 
approximately three months. In November 2001, Petitioner began to experience constant pain 
that was different than the intermittent pain she felt earlier and which caused her to seek medical 
attention. The period of time in which she experienced periodic shoulder pain was short until the 
2 It is noteworthy that Dr. Shepherd opined that, although she had a preexisting upper extremity paresthesias, her 
work may have aggravated her condition - it was not the cause of her condition. 
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pain evolved into chronic pain thereafter. Therefore, Petitionees claim of cumulative trauma is 
distinguishable from an occupational disease claim which typically evolves over a period of 
several months or years. 
The medical panel assessed an impairment rating of 17% to Petitioner's cervical 
condition. And, although it apportioned 60% of the rating to non-industrial factors and 40% to 
industrial, the medical panel apportioned the impairment rating under the occupational disease 
theory and not an industrial accident theory. As Petitioner's claim was based on an industrial 
accident/cumulative trauma theory3, apportionment of an impairment rating would only be 
appropriate when there was objective medical documentation that a prior ratable impairment 
existed before the industrial accident in the same anatomical area. See Utah's 2002 Impairment 
Guides. 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's cervical condition was permanently aggravated by 
her work activities. 
3. Temporary Total and Partial Disability Compensation. 
Sections 34A-2-410 and 411of the Workers Compensation Act govern temporary total 
and partial disability compensation. 
Temporary total and partial disability compensation benefits are payable until the 
healing period has ended and the injured worker's condition has stabilized. "Stabilization means 
that the period of healing has ended and the condition of the claimant will not materially improve. 
Once healing has ended, the permanent nature of the claimant's disability can be assessed and 
benefits awarded accordingly." Booms v. Rapp Construction Co., 720 P.2d 1363 (Utah 1986). 
The preponderance of evidence demonstrates that Petitioner was temporarily and totally 
disabled from her cervical condition based on the opinions of the medical panel and Dr. 
MacFarlane from February 28, 2002, to May 9, 2002. Although the medical panel concurred 
with Dr. MacFarlane that Petitioner was medically stable on June 5, 2002, Petitioner returned to 
work light duty at Respondent's facility on May 9, 2002. 
Petitioner did not present any evidence that Petitioner was entitled to temporary partial 
disability compensation. 
Based on the foregoing, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-410 and Booms, 
Petitioner was entitled to temporary total disability from February 28, 2002, the day of her 
3 it would be improper for this administrative forum to sua sponte change the theory of Petitioner's claim from 
cumulative trauma/industrial accident to occupational disease. See Hilton Hotel and Reliance Insurance v. 
Industrial Comm'n of Utah, 897 P. 2d. 352 (Ct of App. 1995). 
nntzu 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Christensen v. Smith's Food & Drug 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order 
Case No. 2002436, 2002948, 2002949 
Page 12 
surgery, to May 9, 2002, when she returned to work. Petitioner was not entitled to temporary 
partial disability compensation. 
4. Permanent Partial Disability Compensation. _. 
Section 34A-2-412 of the Workers Compensation Act provides for permanent partial 
disability compensation based upon the medical evidence. 
The preponderance of the evidence, based on the opinion of the medical panel, 
demonstrates that Petitioner's cervical condition has an impairment rating of 17% whole person.4 
Although Dr. Shepherd assigned an impairment rating of 23% to Petitioner's condition, he opined 
that there was no medical nexus between her condition and work injury. Accordingly, the medical 
panel's assessment of 17% whole person to Petitioner's condition was the most detailed and careful 
analysis. Although, the medical panel apportioned 60% of Petitioner's impairment rating to non-
industrial factors and 40% to industrial factors, apportionment can only be calculated where there is 
objective medical documentation that a prior ratable impairment existed before the industrial 
accident for the same anatomical area. The only evidence presented regarding Petitioner's prior 
injuries or limitations was the industrial accident on February 1,2001, and the medical panel did not 
find a causal nexus between Petitioner's cervical condition and that incident. Accordingly, as no 
prior impairment that existed prior to the cumulative trauma injury of November 20, 2001, was 
identified, apportionment of Petitioner's permanent impairment rating is not appropriate. 
Based on the foregoing, Petitioner was entitled to an impairment rating of 17% whole person 
due to her cumulative trauma injury of November 20, 2001. 
5. Medical Expenses and Recommended Medical Care. 
The preponderance of evidence, based upon the opinions of the medical panel and Dr. 
MacFarlane, demonstrates that the medical care Petitioner received for her cervical condition 
since November 2001, was necessary. Both the medical panel and Dr. MacFarlane found a 
medical causal connection between Petitioner's cumulative trauma accident on November 20, 
2001, and her need for surgery on February 28, 2002. The medical panel specifically 
determined that the medical treatment Petitioner received as follows was necessary to treat her 
condition: (1) Dr. Yates evaluation in November 2001, including radiography, and Petitioner's 
physical therapy, (2) Dr. MacFarlane's evaluation in January 2002, and Petitioner's MRI scan, 
and (3) Petitioner's cervical discectomy and fusion in February 2002, and follow-up care through 
June 2002. 
The parties did not present any evidence in dispute that was related to the future medical 
care of Petitioner's cervical condition. 
4 Dr. Dall also assessed an impairment rating of 17% whole person to Petitioner's condition, however, he opined that 
the February 1,2001, industrial accident caused her condition which had a cascade effect. 
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Based on the foregoing, Petitioner was entitled to medical expenses, beginning on or 
about November 16, 2001, due to her cumulative trauma accident on November 20, 2001, as 
specified on her Application for Hearing. Medical expenses cannot be apportioned out as 
Petitioner's claim is based on a cumulative trauma/industrial injury theory. 
6. Travel Expenses. 
Petitioner did not present any evidence of travel expenses. 
ORDER 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent shall pay to Petitioner temporary total 
disability compensation at the weekly rate of $421.00 from or 10.1 weeks, for a total of 
$4,252.10. The amount is accrued, due and payable in a lump sum plus interest at eight 
percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall pay to Petitioner permanent partial 
disability compensation at the weekly rate of $369.00 for a permanent impairment rating of 
seventeen percent (17%) whole person, or 53.04 weeks, for a total of $19,571.76. The amount is 
accrued, due and payable in a lump sum at eight percent (8%) per annum. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall pay the statutory attorneys1 fees of 
$4,723.58, plus 20% percent of the interest awarded herein, directly to Richard Burke, Esq., 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-1-309 and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 602-2-4. That 
amount shall be deducted from Petitioner's award and sent directly to the office of Mr. Burke. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Respondent shall pay all medical expenses, including 
any out-of-pocket expenses incurred by Petitioner, reasonably related to her cumulative trauma 
injury of November 20, 2002, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-418(1), and the medical and 
surgical fee schedule of the Utah Labor Commission, plus interest at eight percent (8%) per 
annum, under Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-420(3) and Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-213, 
and travel allowances hereinafter incurred pursuant to Utah Administrative Code, Rule 612-2-20. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's claim for recommended medical care is 
dismissed without prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Petitioner's claim for temporary partial disability 
compensation and travel expenses are dismissed with prejudice. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case No. 2002436 is dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Case No. 2002949 is dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED THIS 29th day of June, 2006. 
UTAH LABOR COmMSSlOH 
LorrieHrfma^^ 
Administrative Law Judge 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
A party aggrieved by the decision may file a Motion for Review with the Adjudication 
Division of the Utah Labor Commission. The Motion for Review must set forth the specific basis 
for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 days from the date this decision is 
signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review within 20 days 
of the date of the Motion for Review. 
Any party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct 
the foregoing review. Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its 
response. If none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will 
be conducted by the Utah Labor Commission. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Order, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on June 29, 2006, to the persons/parties 
at the following addresses: 
Richard Burke Esq 
7390 S Creek Road #104 
Sandy UT 84093 
Bret Gardner Esq 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
PO Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
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Case No. 02-0436,02-0948 
and 02-0949 
Smith's Food & Drug ("Smiths") asks the Utah Labor Commission to review Administrative 
Law Judge Lima's award of benefits to Gina Christensen under the Utah) Workers' Compensation 
Act, Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated. 
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated § 63G-4-301 and § 34A-2-801(3). 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED 
Ms. Christensen claims workers' compensation benefits from Smiths for a work accident that 
occurred on February 1, 2001, and cumulative work trauma that arose by November 20, 2001, 
thereby injuring her cervical spine. Following the evidentiary hearing, a medical panel was 
appointed to review the medical aspects of the case. Based on the panel's opinion, Judge Lima 
found that Ms. Christensen's cervical condition was aggravated by cumulative work trauma that 
arose in November 2001, and awarded benefits. 
In its motion for review, Smiths argues that Ms. Christensen's claim should be classified as 
an occupational disease claim and benefits should therefore be apportioned according to the Utah 
Occupational Disease Act. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts Judge Lima's findings of facts. Those facts relevant to the issue in 
the motion for review can be summarized as follows: 
Ms. Christensen has a history of a preexisting cervical condition dating back to 1989. Ms. 
Christensen worked in Smith's dairy department for eight years. Around July or August, Ms. 
Christensen was experiencing shoulder pain that was exacerbated from her work duties but always 
resolved. In November 2001, Ms. Christensen was working as a cheese cooker in the dairy. This 
position required her and another coworker to work together during a 12-hour shift to cook the milk 
down into cheese curds. Hie milk was cooked in eight large vats, using large and heavy equipment 
(60-70 pounds) that had to be hooked above the vats to stir, cut, and push the finished cheese out of 
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the vat. During the time period she was performing these duties, Ms. Christensen experienced 
stiffness and soreness in her shoulder that was different than the intermittent pain she previously had 
felt. On November 16,2001, she sought medical treatment and x-rays of the cervical spine revealed 
spondylosis consistent with degenerative disc disease. A cervical MRI confirmed she has suffered a 
C6-7 disc herniation, disc abnormality at C5-6 and disc herniation at C4-5. 
Ms. Christensen's doctor, Dr. MacFarlane, performed surgery and observed finding acute 
disc herniations in the cervical spine at various levels. In Dr. MacFarlane's opinion, Ms. Christensen 
suffered an acute event caused by a work injury. Smiths' medical consultant, Dr. Shepherd, 
disagreed and found no medical causation between Ms. Christensen's work activities and her 
cervical disc condition. Based on these conflicting opinions, a medical panel was appointed. 
The medical panel, consisting of a doctor specializing in occupational and environmental 
health and an orthopedic surgeon, reviewed the medical records and examined Ms. Christensen. The 
panel agreed with Dr. MacFarlane's assessment and found that the cumulative work trauma that 
appeared by November 20,2001, medically caused an aggravation to Ms. Christensen's preexisting 
cervical condition. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW 
Under § 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act, in order to recover benefits, 
Ms. Christensen must prove that she was injured "by accident out of and in the course o f her 
employment. Smith's argues that Ms. Christensen did not suffer an accident compensable under the 
workers' compensation act, but rather, over time had developed a cervical disease condition that 
should be compensated under the Utah Occupational Disease Act. 
Although Ms. Christensen had previously reported some shoulder stiffness and pain, as of 
November 20,2001, Ms. Christensen was reporting the development of new shoulder pain unlike her 
previous complaints. At the time of this new development, she was repeatedly lifting and connecting 
lines and heavy screen cutters, paddles, and pushers over eight large vats, and then later, was 
cleaning the large vats, all during a 12-hour shift. Dr. MacFarlane treated Ms. Christensen and 
during surgery, noted acute disc herniations that, in his opinion, showed Ms. Christensen had 
suffered an acute injury from her work. The medical panel agreed with Dr. MacFarlane's opinion 
that there had been an acute event that occurred at work to cause Ms. Christensen's condition. 
The Commission is convinced that due to the repetitive and unusual and extraordinary 
exertion required of Ms. Christensen in performing her duties as a cheese cook, she suffered a 
cumulative trauma injury—or "accident"—by November 20, 2001, which arose out of and in the 
course of her employment. Therefore, the Commission finds that benefits are appropriately awarded 
under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act. As this claim is a claim for workers' compensation 
benefits, there is no need to address whether apportionment might be appropriated under the 
Occupational Disease Act. 
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ORDER 
The Commission affirms Judge Lima's decision. It is so ordered. 
Dated this / ^ d a y of March, 2009. 
Sherri^Hayashi 
Utah Labor Commissioner 
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Labor Commission to reconsider this Order. Any such request for 
reconsideration must be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order. 
Alternatively, any party may appeal this order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for 
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be received by the court within 30 days of 
the date of this order. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Affirming ALJ's Decision in the matter of Gina 
Christensen, Case Nos. 02-0436,02-0948 and 02-0949, was mailed first class postage prepaid this 
J^Zay of March, 2009, to the following: 
Gina Christensen 
1967 W 2175 S 
Syracuse UT 84075 
Smith's 
500 N Sugar St 
LaytonUT 84041 
Richard Burke, Esq. 
7390 S Creek Rd #104 
Sandy UT 84093 
Bret Gardner, Esq. 
257 E 200 S Ste 800 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Sara Danielson 
Utah Labor Commission 
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